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The Political Economy of 
North Korea
But also major changes in North Korean 
political economy over last two decades
Transformation is better understood as an 
unintended response to state failure in the 
wake of the famine than as a top-down reform.
Policy has at times ratified these changes, 
most notably with reforms of 2002
But since 2005 (until 2009?) we have been 
witnessing “reform in reverse”
The Political Economy of North 
Korea II
Nonetheless, the North Korean economy has 
become more open, particularly to China 
Implications of these developments unclear
China more significant for any sanctions 
effort…
Greater incentives for proliferation and illicit 
activities than during periods of effective 
engagement
Inducements are clearly part of current 
opening, but how to design them to 
maximize transformative effects? (Asia 
Society task force)
Sources
Reconstruction of the food economy
Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid and Reform 
(Columbia University Press 2007)
“North Korea on the Brink of Famine” and “Famine 
Redux?” (Peterson Institute 2008)
Reconstruction of the balance of payments and 
trade relations
“North Korea’s Foreign Economic Relations” 
(Peterson Institute 2007 and International 
Relations of the Asia-Pacific)
“Sanctioning North Korea” (Peterson Institute 
2009)
Surveys of Chinese (and South Korean) firms 
operating in North Korea
Evidence from Refugee Surveys
Two surveys
China, 2004-05, 1,300+ respondents 
(Chang, Haggard and Noland)
South Korea, November 2008, 300 
respondents, (Haggard and Noland)

Background: Economic decline 
and recovery
Collapse: the great 






Since 2005, the 
return of slow 
growth (and food 
distress), although 
2008 may be 
























































































































Max Average Min Farmers
grams grams 
Minimum human need (457g)
Declining Reliance on the PDS
Household Response to Famine
The economy marketized in 
response to state failure…
Food and other products in 
the market
The external dimension
The border during the 
famine
[A (temporary) 
intensification of illicit 
activities: missiles, drugs 
and counterfeiting; 
Chestnut]
Partially ratified in 
reforms of 2002
Economy: Central Government 
Policies Ineffective At Grassroots
“Partial” Reforms Associated with an 
Increase in Corruption, Inequality and 
Disaffection
Changing Pathways to 
Advancement
Reform in Reverse: 2005-2009
•The food economy
•The response to markets
•The management of the border trade
•The 2009 New Year’s editorial: “the 150 
day campaign and Chollima”
Origins
On the back of increasing harvests, rising aid 
government seeks to re-assert control
Internally
Banning private trade in grain
Seizures in rural areas
Shut down relief agencies in the 
hinterland
Externally: 2006 missile and nuclear tests 
disrupt assistance from South
Bad weather: the floods of 2007
Evidence I: Quantities




























1.  10/01/2005: Ban on private trade in grain & revival of PDS
2.  07/14/2006- 07/15/2006: Flood
3.  10/09/2006: Nuclear Test & UN Sanctions
4.  08/15/2007- 08/31/2007: Flood
5.  12/01/2007: Introduction of Chinese Export controls, partial ban on trading activities
6.  04/01/2008: Tightened control on trading activities
7.  05/14/2008: Military stocks reportedly ordered released & US aid announcement on the 16th. 
8. 06/30/2008: Arrival of first aid shipment
Evidence III: Qualitative
Direct observation documents 2008 
reemergence of famine-era pathologies
Current Conditions: Food
The good news
2008 harvest probably modest improvement over 
bad base; prices have fallen
Purchases of food and fertilizer in anticipation of 
fallout from rocket launch?
The bad news
Military restocking may limit available 
supply
Price decline may be seasonal, not secular; 
a chronic humanitarian emergency
Government policy remains control-oriented
Limits on markets
Border crack-downs
































2006-2008:  indexed trade values based on 2005 trade figures. 























































































































China Food Exports to DPRK
Current Conditions: Chinese 
firm survey
Mix of activities, 
sectors
Differing types:
Some large SOEs, 
most small private
Most began with 
DPRK 2002 or later
Most from bordering 
provinces



























An inducement in broader North-South relations
Engagement to socialize and transform
The outcome: leverage in reverse
North Korea not only holding hostage until 
release…
But holding entire Kaesong project hostage
Recent evidence of backing off by reducing land 
rent and wage demands
The New Geography of North 
Korean Trade
Beyond China, the growth of ties with 
Middle East (ongoing project)
With new incentives to proliferate
Nuclear cooperation with Syria and Iran
Missiles: even during moratorium on test, 
working with Iran 
Small arms to Burma, perhaps even Hezbollah 
and Hamas
Other illicit activities: the “soprano state”
US concerns: not simply sanctions in 
context of 6PT, but defensive concerns and 
link to Middle East
Some Conclusions
Since 2005, regime insecure with respect to domestic 
political implications of reform and economic change
External stresses and succession exacerbate these 
trends.
DPRK more open (e.g. Orascom, China trade), but…
Seeking non-demanding partners in China, 
developing countries and Middle East
Alternative means of sanctioning: “son of 
BDA,” PSI
Incentives to proliferation




Immediately tested by missile and nuclear 
tests
Orchestrated UNSCR 1874 which went 
beyond UNSCR 1718 in both scope and 
means of enforcement
Renewed interest in financial sanctions a la 
BDA 
But was it a return to Bush 1?
Sanctions, but what inducements?
The Perry approach: offer a choice, but provide a 
channel
The current debate post Clinton trip: the 
pending bilateral, how to reset and what role 
for inducements?




Who are the refugees?, I
Mostly prime age 
adults
More women than 
men
Mostly from the 
Northeast 
provinces
Who are the refugees?, II











Why do they leave?
Mostly “economic 
motivations” bound 








Life in North Korea: Hunger
30 percent (China) and 
33 percent (South 
Korea) report death of 
family member during 
famine
Many unaware of aid 
program (43 percent 
China, 56 percent South 
Korea)
Minority believe receive 
aid (4 percent China, 33 
percent South Korea)
Most believe aid went to 
army, party, government 
officials
Life in North Korea: Crimes 
and punishments, I 







Almost half had 
been detained by 
criminal or political 
police




Most in jip-kyul-so 
(misdemeanor facility) 
or no-dong-dan-ryeon-
dae (labor training 
camp), some in kyo-
wha-so (felony facility) 
or kwan-li-so.
Average incarceration 
between one week and 
one month
Life in North Korea, Crimes 
and Punishments, III
Psychological dimensions
Most would be diagnosed 
with PTSD in clinical setting
Experiences in North Korea 
highly correlated with 







But not regional origin--
reassuring




US attracts younger, 
better educated 
respondents
More might prefer 
China if policies 
changed
Most want 
unification
